Abstract. We study the asymptotic nucleolus of a smooth and symmetric oligopoly with an atomless sector. We show that under appropriate assumptions, the asymptotic nucleolus of the TU market game coincides with the unique TU competitive payoff distribution x * . This equivalence results from nucleolus of a finite game belonging to its core and the Aumann Core Equivalence, which holds for this economy due to the cut-throat competition among the identical large players. A comparison with the Shapley value yields that in some cases, the asymptotic Shapley value is more favorable for the large traders than the asymptotic nucleolus x * . This may be interpreted by the 'fairness property' of Shapley Value which does not reflect the intense competition among the large traders, accounting for the relative importance of their marginal contribution. J.E.L. Classification numbers. C71, D40, D43.
Introduction
We examine a mixed differentiable game, proposed by Aumann [1] , with a few identical big (atomic) players and a continuum of small ones. Whether the big players get a better allocation in a core as compared to a competitive one in a mixed game has been analysed in general by Shitovitz [11] , and in this work we continue investigating the "power" of big players under alternative solution concepts. 1 There are several types of players. Each type of player has a "corner endowment". The worth of a coalition is the maximal output they can produce using their aggregate endowments and all the technologies available to them. Our main result is that the asymptotic core (the limit of the cores of the finite games converging to the initial one, i.e., games in the admissible sequence) of the game with identical big players coincides with the competitive (transferable utility competitive equilibrium, or ØÙ ) payoff. As a consequence, the asymptotic nucleolus (defined for finite games by [9] ) is the ØÙ payoff distribution as well. This is in contrast with the monopoly case, studied in [3] , where nucleolus is strictly better for the monopoly than the ØÙ (hence nucleolus capturing the additional "power" enjoyed by the monopoly). Moreover, we conjecture that each of the identical atoms gets a higher payoff under asymptotic Shapley value than in the asymptotic core.
2. The Model 2.1. Agents. Let T (= T 0 ∪ T 1 ) be the set of players, Σ be the set of all possible coalitions of the players and λ be the "population measure" so that (T, Σ, λ) is a measure space, where λ is a σ−additive positive measure on Σ. The set of players is partitioned into T 1 , big players (the atoms of λ) and T 0 , the small players, i.e., λ = λ 0 + λ 1 , where λ 0 is non-atomic (with support T 0 ), and λ 1 has finite support T 1 and coincides with the counting measure.
Let µ = (µ 1 , .., µ M ) be a vector of countably additive non-trivial measures absolutely continuous with respect to λ. Remark 1. Define x * (S) = pµ(S) for all S ∈ Σ. Since f is homogeneous of degree one, by Euler theorem, pµ(T ) = f (µ(T )) and by concavity
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , M} is constant for any l on T 0 ∩ A l and µ is constant for any l on the atoms of
Let r ≥ 2 be the greatest common divisor of the numbers of big players of different types:
T be a coalition of players such that for every S ′ ⊂ S r , there is S ⊂ T , containing players of the same types as S ′ such that λ(S) = λ(S ′ )r, so that T is an r-replica of S r .
2.4.
The admissible sequence of finite games. Definition 1. An admissible sequence of finite games is defined by an increasing sequence, (π n ) ∞ n=1 , of finite subfields of Σ, with the corresponding set of all atoms Π n of π n , such that (1) π n ⊂ π n+1 for every n = 1, 2 . . . ; (2) every subset of T 1 is in π 1 ; (3) for every l, T 0 ∩ A l ∈ π 1 ; (4) for any n, any two "small" players of the same type i n , j n ∈ Π n , i n , j n ⊂ T 0 ∩ A l , are of the same size λ(i n ) = λ(j n ); (5) r is also a divisor of
∀i n ∈ Π n , i n ⊂ T 0 ∩A l , i.e., for every n there is a natural number k such that λ(A l ∩ T 0 ) = krλ(i n ); (6) and ∪ ∞ n=1 π n generates Σ. Remark 2. So, Π n can be thought of as the set of all players of the finite game, with the set of all its subsets (coalitions) being identified with π n , as in [3, p.191] .
Denote the restriction of the game V to π n by V n .
Remark 3. By def. 1. (4)- (5), the definition of the core and [2] for any n any two "small" players of the same type i n , j n ∈ Π n , i n , j n ⊂ T 0 ∩ A l and any two big players of the same type have the "equal treatment" property. The same holds for the nucleolus since there any two exchangeable players get the same allocation.
Results

3.1.
Asymptotic core of the induced game. Theorem 1. Let x n be in the core of V n . Then lim n→∞ x n (S) = pµ(S)(= x * (S)) for every S ⊂ T 0 , S ∈ π 1 .
Proof. By rem. 1 the core of any game in the admissible sequence is nonempty. Since S is in π 1 , it is a finite union of some disjoint coalitions i ∈ π 1 (or players in Π 1 ). S being a subset of T 0 implies that all such i are subsets of T 0 too. Since the admissible sequence is increasing, S ∈ π n for any n. Let B n ⊂ Π n be the finite set of disjoint i n ⊂ T 0 such that their union is S. For any game V n and any player i n ∈ B n , since x n is a core allocation,
Since x n is additive (being a measure) and by rem. 3 x n (
x n (T ), and by homogeneity of degree one of f , f (µ(
. Combining with the inequalities above, we get
By the homogeneity of f , ∇f (µ(T )) = ∇f 1 r µ(T ) and since f is (continuously) differentiable in the neighbourhood of µ(T ), it is so in an ε-neighbourhood of
. For any such ε there is N 0 sufficiently large, such that for all n > N 0 one can assure µ(i n ) < ε for any i n ∈ B n , so for n > N 0 , by concavity of f , the last inequality can be re-written as ∇f µ(
By continuity of ∇f in the ε-neighbourhood of µ(
such that for any 0 < δ <δ there is N 1 ≥ N 0 such that for any n > N 1 , ∇f µ(
Taking the limit as δ → 0, we get the result. As in [10] , [1] , define the market game as follows.
Definition 2. For any S ∈ Σ, let an S−feasible allocation be a profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x M ), such that for any m ∈ {1, . . . , M}
where the supremum is taken over all S−feasible allocations x.
Notation 3.1. Denote byΣ the set of coalitions that contain all types:
, A ⊂ T , x m (t) ∈ Ê + will be denoted simply by A x(t)dλ(t) for x(t) ∈ Ê Proof. First, v(S) = 0 for any coalition that does not contain a positive fraction of at least one type, since then the integral over all F l is zero. Next, v(S) is bounded for any coalition S ∈Σ (that contains all types): by concavity, for any type l
so, the boundedness follows by S−feasibility of allocation x (def. 2) (implying the last integral is finite). Second, the supremum is attained: by inequality 3, for any S the maximization problem reduces to the problem of optimal allocation of inputs across L technologies, i.e., finding
. By homogeneity of F l , this problem is equivalent to
The required properties of f follow from those of F l .
3.5. Uniqueness of the asymptotic core for symmetric oligopoly. Corollary 2. If every big player t ∈ T 1 is of the same type, then the asymptotic core is x * , since the "equal treatment" applies to big players, each of whom gets
Corollary 3. If every big player in T 1 is of the same type, then the asymptotic nucleolus is also x * .
3.6.
A transferable utility competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3. A transferable utility competitive equilibrium (ØÙ ) of the economy is a T-feasible allocation z and a price p ∈ Ê M + , p = 0 such that for every t ∈ A l and ∀l, z * (t) solves max g U l (g, pω(t) − pg),
Proof. Any (finite) game in an admissible sequence should have n small players and two big ones. Each of the small players holds 1 n ω 0 . The (marginal) contribution of any big player to a coalition of k small players is h 1 ( k n ), where h 1 : t → F (tω 0 + ω 1 ); while the contribution to a coalition already containing a big player and k small ones is h 2 (
There are (n + 2)! possible permutations of all players. For any position k of the first big player there are (n + 2 − k)n! permutations where the second big player follows the first, while in the rest ((k−1)n!) the opposite is true. Therefore Shapley value for a big player a i is
To establish the claim it is sufficient to show that the first summand converges to (1−t)h 1 (t)dt as n → ∞.
We demonstrate the latter in detail, the proof of the former is analogous and is left to the reader. Let g n (t) = (1 − nt+1 n+2
)h 1 (t), then the second term can be written as a Lebesgue integral z n (t)dµ of a simple function z n returning a constant value g n (
It is then left to show that z n converges uniformly on [0, 1] to the function t → (1 − t)h 1 (t). Indeed, by triangular inequality,
The first term can be made arbitrarily small for large enough n:
For the second term it follows from absolute continuity of F (and hence h 1 ) and thus g n on [0, 1]. Thus, the uniform convergence. Proof. The ØÙ payoff of a big player is equal to ∇F (ω 0 + 2ω 1 )ω 1 in the economy with the simple duopoly. Using the specification of F , this payoff is
√ xy, which is smaller than the Shapley value calculated using proposition 1, √ xy(
)).
Comments and a Conjecture
To restate: our main result is that if there is more than one big player in a smooth economy, the asymptotic nucleolus assigns to every big player an allocation with the same value as his competitive payoff. One could interpret the result as reflecting the fierce competition among the big players (e.g.,à la Bertrand). However, Shapley value might assign a better allocation to a big player than his competitive payoff, and we conjecture this is true in general for an economy with several big players (of the same type) and a smooth production.
Note that the asymptotic Shapley value in prop. 1 for a simple duopoly corresponds to a heuristic based on the result of [4] showing that the asymptotic Shapley value for scalar games of bounded variation (converging to a mixed game) is one of the values of the mixed game characterized by [7] , 2 such that the 'location' of every big player (in a 'permutation') is uniformly and independently distributed on the unit interval. Indeed, then for the mixed game, the Shapley value allocates [(1 − t)h 1 (t) + th 2 (t)]dt to a big player. The asymptotic Shapley value to the syndicate (a single big) player in [6] is also consistent with this heuristic calculation, and it can be obtained directly using the similar argument to the proof of prop. 1, which should be extendible to any number of big players of the same type rather easily. Thus the main challenge in proving the conjecture is showing that the inequality asserted in cor. 4 holds in general.
